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ABSTRACT 
The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate on the 
facets of the Greek crisis via an analysis of the changes in the institutional 
framework of the labour market that are introduced as a result of the EU/IMF 
mechanism for financial support. The paper tries to make sense of the 
immense transformations in the Greek industrial relations system and to 
evaluate the direction of change, using insights from the varieties of 
capitalism literature. In this strand of literature it is well established that the 
comparative institutional advantage and high economic performance of a 
country depends on its overall institutional arrangement and the fit between 
different institutions (including the industrial relations sphere). Thus, it is 
important to examine the current injection of liberal market elements in the 
Greek industrial relations realm vis-à-vis the wider institutional context. This 
will allow us to gauge the suitability and chances for the implementation of 
IMF’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies. 
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Institutional Change in Greek Industrial Relations 
in an Era of Fiscal Crisis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
For the past couple of years, Greece is going through the most important 
social, political and economic crisis since the transition to democracy 
(Metapoliteusi) in 1974. The signing of the Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policies (Memorandum), on May the 2
nd
, 2010, between the Greek 
government and the EC, the ECB and the IMF (the so-called troika), put Greece 
on a trajectory of unprecedented austerity measures whose consequences will 
be felt for a long period. Through the original Memorandum, Greece’s 
creditors have pushed for important changes across two policy pillars: fiscal 
consolidation and the improvement of the economy’s competitiveness. 
The first pillar entails a drastic elimination of the budget deficit through cuts in 
public expenditure and increases in public revenues. To achieve the former, 
the agreement involved cuts in public investment and in public sector wages, 
a reform of the pensions system, and a general slimming of the public sector, 
while the latter is pursued via a restructuring of the taxation system and the 
fighting of tax evasion, the elimination of corruption, and the privatisation of a 
large section of public sector enterprises and utilities.
1
 The second pillar, on 
the other hand, aimed at creating a more attractive environment for 
                                                 
1
 It must be noted that the Greek government had already started implementing similar 
policies during the Memorandum’s negotiations phase, in an apparent attempt to show its 
commitment in deep-cutting fiscal reforms. Law 3833/2010, which was voted before the 
signing of the Memorandum, cut down the civil servants’ wages and pensions by eliminating 
the “thirteen” and “fourteenth” salary and pension, by setting an upper limit on public 
sector salaries, by drastically reducing overtime and other benefits, and by decreasing new 
hires, following the “1-5” rule (one hiring for every five exits). 
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investment. To this end, the government was bound to reduce the labour cost 
in the private sector, via a process of internal devaluation and through 
changes in the collective bargaining system, the opening up of any remaining 
‘closed professions’, the simplification of the processes to set up new 
enterprises, and the elimination of bureaucracy. Most recently, the ‘Medium-
Term Fiscal Strategy’, agreed on June 2011, further enhanced the original 
Memorandum agreement through the adoption of extra measures to attend 
to the above targets. 
Since the eruption of the crisis in 2009 there has been considerable debate 
among academics and policy-makers with regard to the suitability of the 
policy-mix at EU-level (De Grauwe 2010; Mabbett and Schelkle 2010; Scharpf 
2011) and  the different facets of the Greek crisis (Lapavitsas 2010; 
Featherstone 2011; Monastiriotis 2011). The main aim of this paper is to 
contribute on the on-going debate via an analysis and evaluation of the 
changes in the institutional framework of the labour market that were 
introduced as a result of the Memorandum and of subsequent agreements. By 
implication, the paper has an exploratory character, trying to make sense of 
the immense transformations in the industrial relations system and to 
evaluate them by using insights from the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
literature. In this strand of literature it is well established that the comparative 
institutional advantage and high economic performance of a country depends 
on its overall institutional arrangement (including the industrial relations 
sphere) and the fit between different institutions. It is thus important to 
examine the prospective changes in the Greek industrial relations context in 
relation to the other realities of the country. This will allow us to gauge the 
suitability and chances for the implementation of the IMF’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
policies. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present 
the changes in labour market institutions by dividing them into three phases, 
and we elaborate on the particular changes that they bring to the industrial 
relations system. The third section examines the possible effects the 
institutional changes may have on the Greek system of industrial relations 
taking into account the specificities of the Greek model of capitalism. The final 
section concludes and discusses avenues for further research. 
 
2. Decentralising Greek Industrial Relations: From individual labour 
rights to collective bargaining institutions 
Discussions about flexibility and the liberalisation of the labour market are not 
new in the Greek political agenda. From the mid-1990s onwards, the 
employer associations urged for greater flexibility in the labour market and for 
the reduction of labour costs. Additionally, the mid-1990s and the early 2000s 
were characterised by several social dialogue attempts to alter the existing 
system, although all the proposed measures were quite moderate compared 
to the Memorandum-era policies (Featherstone 2011). The Troika was quite 
insistent on the need to reduce labour cost to boost employment through the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining and the introduction of wage and 
time flexibility. Its flagship in this effort was the demand to eliminate the role 
occupied by the industry-level agreements in the Greek system of industrial 
relations (see below), and to reform the mediation and arbitration system. To 
achieve higher flexibility, it pressed for changes in the collective dismissals 
regulations and for the introduction of flexible forms of employment.  
The Memorandum (Law 3845/2010, Annex III, p. 12) outlined the Greek 
government’s agreement on implementing deep-cutting and fundamental 
changes in the above themes. The government’s aim was to render wages in 
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the private sector “more flexible to allow cost moderation for an extended 
period of time” (IMF 2010: 59), in line with the reforms it had introduced 
some months ago in the public sector. The reformation of collective 
bargaining regulation and the abolition of asymmetry in arbitration
2
 were 
among the top of its priorities, followed by the introduction of flexible wages 
for young employees, the reform of the legislation on collective dismissals and 
on apprenticeship, and the establishment of an environment that would 
facilitate the use of part-time and flexible employment. 
Despite the government’s agreement to the Troika’s demands, the social and 
political cost of the above measures did not allow – at least in the beginning – 
their full implementation. Although labour cost reduction was relatively 
feasible in the public sector (where wages were unilaterally determined by the 
Minister of Finance and were not negotiated with the unions) an analogous 
interference in the private sector would constitute a direct intervention in the 
institution of free collective bargaining.  
Still, the government was bound to make the necessary changes in the 
institutional framework and thus indirectly influence the wage levels in the 
private sector. To better appreciate the extent and depth of the policies, one 
can classify them in three distinct phases. During the first phase, from May 
2010 till December 2010, the government introduced changes in individual 
labour law, and prepared the ground for the redefinition of the institutions of 
collective bargaining. At this phase the government also exerted pressures to 
the social actors to negotiate a pay-freeze for the following three years. The 
second phase, from December 2010 till October 2011, was characterised by 
the introduction of a new legislation (Law 3899/2010), which was built upon 
the institutional grounds created in the previous phase and which altered the 
                                                 
2
 I.e. the unilateral right reserved for some categories of unions to resort to arbitration. See 
p. 10 for a more detailed analysis. 
  5 
established structure of collective bargaining and of the mediation and 
arbitration process. Finally, the third phase is characterised by the voting of 
Law 4024/2011, which further decentralises collective bargaining and puts 
Greek employment relations in a new trajectory. The common element of all 
phases is that they progressively allow for the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining institutions and alter the allocation of power between the social 
actors. However, the important question raised in this context is whether the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining will be able to achieve its stated aims 
and, if not, why? Before discussing the answer to this question in the next 
section, it is necessary to examine in detail the new framework for 
employment relations in Greece. 
 
2.1. Setting the ground: Flexible wages, flexible forms of employment and 
working time flexibility 
The first phase of the institutional changes in Greek industrial relations is 
characterised by the government’s attempts to modify the rules governing the 
individual employment contract and thus prepare the ground for further 
decentralisation of the collective employment relations institutions. As the 
government could not directly impose a wage reduction in the private sector, 
it focused on the alteration of several provisions in individual labour law such 
as the compensation of overtime work and flexible forms of employment, thus 
creating the necessary conditions for the indirect reduction of labour costs. 
The law that ratified the Memorandum in the Greek legal system, Law 
3845/2010, included several provisions regarding the status of collective 
agreements, the compensation of young employees, the policies on 
dismissals, and overtime compensation. The most important ruling was that of 
article 2 par. 7, which introduced the possibility of derogation from the 
industry level or the national collective agreements. According to the article, 
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and contrary to existing regulations, the terms and conditions of occupational 
or firm-level collective agreements were allowed to deviate from the ones 
prescribed at the industry or national levels. The wording of the provision 
could effectively abolish the national collective agreement and render the 
industry-level agreements redundant (Mpakopoulos 2010). However, the 
rulings of the law were quite vague and were left to be further specified in 
later laws or presidential decrees. 
The first such specification came with Law 3846/2010, which attempted to 
introduce elements of ‘flexicurity’. Its major focus was the settlement of the 
nature, conduct and compensation of part-time work, making it cheaper and 
easier for an employer to use these non-standard employment forms as well 
as the services of temporary employment agencies. Moreover the law also 
dealt with the management of working time, allocating the right to negotiate 
working time changes not only to the trade unions but also to an association 
of employees. Until then, the latter body had quite restricted rights compared 
to a trade union, as it did not have any rights to negotiate wages or to call 
strikes, and may not have necessarily been representative of the enterprise’s 
employees
3
. For example, according to the new law, an association of five 
employees, in a company that employs at least 20 employees (i.e. one-fourth 
of the existing staff), is able to negotiate changes in the working time for the 
whole workforce.  
Although the above law set the ground for the adoption of flexible forms of 
employment, thus indirectly helping reduce labour costs, Law 3863/2010, 
voted in July 2010, adopted some direct measures to that effect. The 
compensation for, and the calculation of, overtime compensation was 
significantly reduced, and the law introduced several provisions regarding the 
                                                 
3
 The status of the association of employees was altered a year later, with Law 4024/2011 
(see below). 
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compensation of young employees. Already since May 2011, Mrs Louka 
Katseli, the then Minister of Labour, had promised to the Federation of Tourist 
Enterprises (SETE) that a law would soon be passed to allow wages of any 
worker between 18 and 25 years of age to negatively deviate around 20% 
from the ones agreed at the industry level
4
. Law 3863/2010 went a step 
further, allowing an employer to hire apprentices between the ages of 15-18 
with wage-rates 30% below the national minimum wage, or to hire young 
workers below the age of 25 at a wage-rate of 84% of the national minimum 
wage. These practices further advance a provision of Law 3845/2010 
according to which an employer could hire unemployed young workers up to 
the age of 24 for a period of 12 months at wage-rates 20% below the national 
minimum wage, and are reminiscent of the Contrat Première Embauche that 
was attempted to be introduced in France in 2006 (GSEE 2011).  
As part of its flexibility agenda, the government also altered the dismissal 
protection framework, to make it easier and cheaper for companies to lay-off 
employees. Towards this end, two fundamental changes were introduced 
through Law 3863/2010: the first, and most important, was the increase of 
the upper boundary regarding group dismissals. Prior to the new law, 
companies employing between 20 and 150 employees were allowed to lay-off 
up to four employees per month, whereas companies with more than 150 
employees were allowed to lay-off up to 2% of their workforce per month. 
Under the new regime, the first group can lay-off up to six employees per 
month, and the latter up to 5%, and not more than 30 employees, per month. 
Second, the new law introduced important changes in the calculation of the 
dismissal compensation, rendering the whole process much cheaper for the 
employer.
5
  
                                                 
4
 Eleftherotypia, 21 May 2011. 
5
 In effect, the new law changed the warning time that is required before firing an employee. 
In Greece, compensation is calculated based on the years an employee works for a company. 
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All the above changes, with the exception of article 2 par. 7 of Law 3845/2010, 
were attempts to restrain and control labour cost by altering several 
provisions of the existing structure of individual labour law. Yet they were 
inadequate to control the major source of labour cost increases, i.e. the 
collective agreements. To this end, two important interventions were made 
during this first phase of decentralisation. The first was the indirect 
governmental pressure to the social actors to negotiate miniscule pay 
increases for the next three years, which ultimately accounted for a three-year 
pay-freeze. The negotiations for the signing of the 2010-2012 national 
collective agreement were quite turbulent, as the main employers’ association 
(SEV) stalled the procedure, whereas the other two employers’ associations 
(GSEVEE and ESEE) adopted milder and, in some cases, worker-friendly 
positions
6
. In the end, the social partners agreed that the “13
th
 and 14
th
 
monthly wages” would be retained
7
, and that any increase in the national 
minimum wage would be based on the Eurozone’s Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) and not on the national consumer price index (CPI).
8 
 
The second important intervention, which set the tone for the changes that 
followed in phases two and three, was the direct interference of the state to 
the content of the decisions reached by the Organisation of Mediation and 
Arbitration (OMED).
9
 Article 51 of Law 3871/2010 annulled all arbitration 
                                                                                                                                            
Depending on this, notice periods also differ. By reducing notice periods the amount of 
compensation can be reduced, in some cases, by 50%. 
6
 SEV (Σύνδεσμος Επιχειρήσεων και Βιομηχανιών - ΣΕΒ) is the national confederation 
representing big businesses and industries; GSEVEE (Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Επαγγελματιών 
Βιοτεχνών Έμπορων Ελλάδος - ΓΣΕΒΕΕ) is the national confederation representing SMEs and 
smaller industries, and ESEE (Εθνική Συνομοσπονδία Ελληνικού Εμπορίου - ΕΣΕΕ) is the 
national confederation representing merchants. 
7
 In Greece, all full time employees (in both the public and the private sector) receive two 
extra wages: a full wage before Christmas (as a Christmas bonus), and two half-wages before 
Easter and before their summer leave.   
8
 In 2010, the HICP stood at 1.6%, whereas Greece’s inflation rate was 4.7%.  
9
 OMED was founded in 1992 as a tripartite institution of the Greek industrial relations 
system to deal with industrial disputes between trade unions and employers. Law 
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decisions that offered wage increases during 2010, or might offer any 
increases in the first semester of 2011. Moreover, all arbitration decisions 
from the 1st of July 2011 until the end of 2012 cannot offer wage increases 
above the level of the annual percentage change of the HICP. Effectively, this 
provision places a tight control on the arbitrators’ judgement and compels 
them to policies of wage restraint.  
Despite these important changes in the employment relations institutions, the 
Greek government was, apparently, slow in implementing the complete 
agreement package, as no specific policy had been decided on the regulation 
of collective bargaining or on the reform of the mediation and arbitration 
process. Indeed in their first and second evaluations, in August and November 
2010 respectively, the Troika was quick to indicate that, although “[M]ajor 
labour market reforms are now advanced well ahead of the December 2010 
deadline … labour market rules could be brought further into line with best 
practices in other European countries and the common principles on 
flexicurity” (Commission 2010a: 42). More specifically, the policy 
recommendations focused on four major axes: first, on the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining via the promotion and the institutional strengthening of 
firm level bargaining; this did not only entail the supremacy of the firm level 
agreements over the sectoral ones, but also the elimination of the possibility 
“for the MoL [Ministry of Labour] to extend coverage of sectoral and 
occupational agreements to firms and workers not represented in 
negotiations” (Commission 2010b: 30). Second, on the reform of the 
arbitration process to “operate according to transparent and objective 
principles and with non-interference from the government” (Commission 
2010a: 42). Third, on further facilitating the use of part-time work and of other 
flexible forms of employment, and on the elimination of any temporal limits in 
                                                                                                                                            
3899/2010, however, significantly marginalises the role of the State in its structures, thus 
rendering it a bipartite institution. 
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the use of the services of temporary work agencies; and, finally, on the further 
promotion of flexible time-management.  
The government had already agreed on the above lines since August the 6th 
(MoF 2010a) – before the publication of the Troika’s first report – by stating 
that “further measures will be taken to reform collective bargaining, including 
the elimination of the automatic extension of sectoral agreements to those 
nor represented in the negotiations” (ibid. 7) and by promoting the adoption 
of legislation “to introduce symmetry in the arbitration system, while 
strengthening its independence and transparency” (ibid. 7), a position which 
was reiterated in its second Memorandum of Understanding in November 
2010 (MoF 2010b: 11). The second phase of the institutional changes, 
therefore, was dedicated to the achievement of the above targets, amidst a 
setting of unprecedented industrial and social conflict. 
 
2.2. Decentralising collective institutions: the reform of collective bargaining 
and of mediation and arbitration 
In December 2010 Law 3899/2010 was voted by the Greek parliament dealing, 
among other things, with two important issues: the structure of collective 
bargaining and the nature of mediation and arbitration. The importance of the 
new law for the institutions of collective bargaining cannot be overstated, as it 
brought fundamental changes to the existing system of collective bargaining 
and constituted the first actual attempt for the push towards its 
decentralisation. As mentioned before, the newly introduced legislation was 
either vague regarding the shape of collective bargaining institutions, or dealt 
primarily with individual labour rights. By contrast, the new law aimed to 
address the major issues underlined by the Troika’s reports, and to fill the 
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gaps of previous legislation – especially of Law 3845/2010 regarding the status 
of collective agreements. 
The first important change introduced by Law 3899/2010 was the 
establishment of a new type of collective agreement called the “Special 
Operational Collective Agreement” (SOCA), which could be applied in 
companies that faced dire financial strains. The SOCA was a construct created 
by the Ministry of Labour to allow for the derogation of wages from the ones 
signed at the sectoral level without, however, completely abolishing the 
latter’s role in the system of collective bargaining. The SOCA could be signed 
either by the firm’s union or, in case such a union did not exist, by the local 
sectoral union or the national sectoral federation.  
Up until then, the system of collective bargaining was based on four types of 
collective agreements (Law 1876/1990): the national agreement, which set 
the minimum wage and the minimum terms and conditions of employment, 
the national sectoral and the national occupational agreements, the local 
sectoral and the local occupational agreements, and the firm-level agreement. 
Law 1876/1990 established a hierarchy among these different kinds of 
agreements, according to which the more decentralised agreements overruled 
the more centralised agreements if, and only if, the former’s terms and 
conditions of employment were better than the latter’s. For example, for a 
firm level agreement to be implemented, its content should be either more 
advantageous to employees or of the same extent as the one agreed at the 
sectoral level, otherwise the latter would apply. Moreover, in the case a 
sectoral or occupational-level agreement was signed by employers (or their 
respective associations) that employed 51% of the workforce in the particular 
sector, the law allowed for the extension of the agreement to all the workers 
in the sector (or occupation).  
  12 
With the introduction of the SOCA the terms and conditions negotiated under 
this agreement were allowed to deviate from the ones agreed at the industry 
level but not from the ones agreed at the national level. This new construct, 
therefore, abrogated the provision of article 2 par. 7 of Law 3845/2010 (see 
above), and the wage floor set by the national collective agreement was 
protected and could not be overruled in any case. Moreover, any wage 
reduction below the levels prescribed by the sectoral agreement was deemed 
illegal, unless agreed under a SOCA. For a SOCA to be valid, however, it should 
be submitted, together with a justification for its existence, to the Council of 
Social Control of the Labour Inspectorate, which opined on the agreement’s 
necessity, but did not have the right to prohibit it or alter it in any way. 
The rationale behind the introduction of this new form of collective 
agreement was to allow companies facing serious financial problems to 
reduce wages below the industry’s threshold and, therefore, to improve their 
situation. The ‘favourability principle’, according to which an employee’s 
terms and conditions of employment were determined by the most 
favourable collective agreement, was now lifted in favour of the SOCA. As 
Leventis (2011: 98) argued, the legislator’s aim was to provide the opportunity 
to a company facing financial strains to adjust the terms and conditions of 
employment to the market conditions, without being confined by the 
agreements signed at the sectoral or occupation level. The ultimate goal was 
to assist companies in the verge of bankruptcy to survive and, consequently, 
to preserve jobs. Contrary to the Troika’s initial requests, the law adopted a 
more social perspective by not legalising the move towards the complete 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, a decision that reflected the internal 
conflicts and pressures the government faced from its own party members, 
and from the trade unions.  
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Apart from its focus on collective bargaining, the new law also introduced 
some important changes in the system of mediation and arbitration. The 
restructuring of the arbitration process was central in the initial Memorandum 
negotiations and in the Troika’s consequent reports, and revolved around two 
interconnected issues: the need to eliminate the asymmetry in the arbitration 
process, and the need to curb the – supposed – subjectivity of the mediators 
and arbitrators. This is evident both in the original Memorandum (Annex II of 
Law 3845/2010, p. 1346) and in all the laws that preceded Law 3899/2010 
(see article 73 of Law 3863/2010 and article 51 of Law 3871/2010).  
Asymmetry is a legal term that prescribes who, and under what conditions, 
has the right to appeal to arbitration. According to the older Law 1876/1990, 
to reach the arbitration stage the two parties had to pass through mediation, 
and only when this had failed the former could be activated. However, in the 
case of failing negotiations at the national, sectoral or occupational level, only 
the trade unions had the right to appeal to arbitration if the employer had 
rejected the mediator’s proposal, or had not participated in the mediation 
process. Asymmetry, therefore, concerned the unilateral right reserved for the 
above unions to appeal to arbitration
10
. The employers’ associations had 
always pressed for the elimination of this ‘inequality’ in accessing arbitration. 
In 2003, for example, the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece (SVVE) 
appealed to the European Court of Justice regarding the asymmetry in 
reaching arbitration, arguing that it is an “un-free process”
11
. Under the 
auspices of the new law, the asymmetry was lifted, thus making it possible for 
any negotiating party to resort to arbitration. Although this looks like a just 
decision that creates a balance in the negotiation process, most probably it 
will lead to a deterioration of the institution of arbitration and the creation of 
                                                 
10
 Asymmetry did not exist for negotiations taking place at the firm level or at publicly owned 
enterprises (DEKO), where the employer could also revert to arbitration if the negotiations 
failed. 
11
 Eleftherotypia, 18 May 2003. 
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further imbalance in the relations between the two parties. To better 
appreciate this point, however, it is crucial to understand why the 
‘asymmetry’ existed in the first place. 
The previous law on mediation and arbitration, Law 1876/1990, was an 
innovative law that replaced an obsolete and rigid system of arbitration, 
regulated by a law from the 1950s (Law 3239/1955). Until 1992, when OMED 
was established, any negotiation that could not result in an agreement was 
dealt by the labour courts in a context of compulsory arbitration. The two 
parties did not have the opportunity to resolve their differences in an 
intermediate stage and were obliged to accept the court’s ruling. Law 
1876/1990, however, introduced the notion of mediation as an intermediate 
stage before reaching arbitration. The explicit intention of the legislator was 
to promote social dialogue and collective bargaining, and to help the parties 
reach a mutually accepted agreement. As Kazakos (1998: 132) argued, within 
this context, mediation retained a central role and arbitration became an 
auxiliary right, a safety valve in case the two parties could not reach an 
agreement. 
Since the majority of collective agreements were signed at the national, 
occupational and (after their introduction by Law 1867/1990) sectoral level, 
the legislator wanted to ensure that the two parties would exhaust all 
possibilities for reaching an agreement before resorting to arbitration. The 
clause that forbade the employers’ associations at these levels to appeal to 
arbitration served exactly this purpose (Kazakos 1998: 131 ff.). Given the 
power imbalance in the employment relationship, the legislator chose to 
benefit the trade unions with the right to unilaterally revert to arbitration if 
they encountered an unbendable employer’s association, and the 
negotiations reached a deadlock. This right was, in other words, a ‘weapon’ at 
the hands of the unions to persuade the employers to take negotiations 
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seriously and to approach the negotiating table in a cooperative way. To 
countervail this right imbalance, however, the legislator suspended the right 
to strike for ten days from the day the unions appealed to arbitration (Kazakos 
1998: 137). 
How far this regulation helped to promote social dialogue is a contested issue. 
Ioannou (1995; 2011) for instance, argued that in many cases Law 1876/90 
replicated the old arbitration system as both parties used mediation as an 
intermediate step to eventually reach arbitration. Although this has 
undoubtedly occurred in many cases, presumably in negotiations where the 
perceived conflict between the two parties was so intense that a negotiated 
agreement was impossible to be reached by default, OMED’s data suggest 
that the system of mediation has contributed to the signing of agreements 
between the two parties, showing that some kind of accord can be reached. 
For instance, though compulsory arbitration accounted for about 42% of the 
cases initially submitted for mediation in OMED between 1992-2010, in terms 
of the total number of collective agreements signed in Greece at that period 
they constituted a mere 15%, a significant change from the situation prior to 
the establishment of OMED where compulsory arbitration decisions 
accounted for 56% of the total collective agreements signed in the country 
(OMED 2010: 11).
12
 
Apart from altering the access to arbitration, the new law also modified the 
subject matter of the arbitration decision (Leventis 2011). Although under the 
previous Law 1876/1990 the arbitrator could regulate any aspect of a 
collective agreement – i.e. both its substantive and procedural nature – the 
new law restricts the arbitrator’s ruling only at the regulation of wages, 
leaving the rest substantive issues (such as working hours, benefits, overtime 
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 During 1992-2010, 6761 collective agreements were signed, 997 of which were due to 
compulsory arbitration (i.e. 14.7%). 
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compensation, promotions etc), as well as the procedural ones in the remit of 
negotiations between the parties. Moreover, the arbitrator’s proposal must 
take into consideration “the financial condition and the development of the 
establishment’s competitiveness” (article 16 par. 5 of Law 1876/1990 as 
replaced by Law 3899/2010). In combination with the restriction on the level 
of wage increases imposed by article 51 of Law 3871/2010 (see above), the 
arbitrators’ decisions are confined to a narrow financial rationale. 
Although in the past arbitrators’ decisions could take into consideration the 
weaker party’s demands and position (conventionally, labour) the new law’s 
focus on the company’s financial sustainability raises important barriers in 
reaching socially ‘just’ agreements. The survival of a company in the verge of 
bankruptcy entails several benefits for all the company’s stakeholders; 
however, the restriction the law imposes on the content of the arbitrators’ 
decision may generate a series of inequalities. Cutting costs through wage 
freezes, or wage reductions, is certainly one way of dealing with a financially 
troubled company, but so is the rationalisation of production or changes in 
the labour process (e.g. on the number of shifts, breaks, reduction of working 
hours etc.) or in other aspects of pay (e.g. a change in the calculation of 
overtime compensation). The new law does not allow for any such 
interventions, thus making the (downward) manipulation of wages the only 
alternative to bankruptcy. 
Despite these important changes in the core institutions of collective 
bargaining, the Troika deemed that the government was lacking behind in the 
full implementation of the original Memorandum agreement. As the 
Commission noted in its third evaluation report in February 2011, the “new 
labour law adopted in December has been a positive step forward but further 
adjustment may be necessary”, as the SOCAS are “a tool for only limited wage 
decentralisation targeted to firms in difficulty, rather than … a powerful 
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instrument to increase employment and improve competitiveness. The 
government has not legislated the elimination of the extension of sectoral 
collective agreements to all firms in each sector” (Commission 2011a: 33). 
Indeed, the SOCAs could only be implemented in companies that faced 
important financial strains and the opining role of the Labour Inspectorate 
ensured that this right would not be exploited. The Troika argued that this was 
an unnecessary obstacle to decentralisation proper, as “it generates 
unnecessary red-tape, and a negative opinion may create social and political 
stigma” (ibid. 33). Thus, to ensure that “wages are in line with productivity and 
the specific conditions of each firm” (ibid. 33), the way forward should include 
four facets (ibid. 34 & 55): (i) the elimination of the extension of sectoral and 
occupational agreements to parties not represented in negotiations, (ii) the 
introduction of legislation that would facilitate the establishment of firm-level 
trade unions, (iii) the adoption of legislation to allow the greater use of fixed-
term contracts, and (iv) the amendment of Law 3846/2010, to allow for 
greater flexibility in working-time management. 
Although the last two points were addressed in Law 3986/2011 (the, so-called, 
‘Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy’ – Μεσοπρόθεσμο Πλαίσιο Δημοσιονομικής 
Στρατηγικής), which further institutionalised flexible employment and flexible 
working time arrangements, the settlement of the first two points, due to 
their complexity and serious social nature, was postponed for a later date. As 
the Commission pointed out in its July 2011 report (Commission 2011b: 39-
40), the SOCAs did not yield the expected results, due to several ‘restrictions’ 
of the law, the most important being the intervention of sectoral unions in the 
process. Therefore, as the Troika had already overtly stated in their previous 
reports, the government needed to facilitate the establishment of firm-level 
negotiations and to lift the influence of the Labour Inspectorate in the 
process. 
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2.3. Decentralisation proper: the marginalisation of sectoral collective 
agreements in the Greek system of industrial relations 
The last phase (thus far) of the institutional changes in the employment 
relations system is characterised by the adoption of further decentralisation 
policies, in line with the Troika’s recommendations. In October 2011, amidst a 
political crisis and pending the sixth instalment of the loan, the government 
voted a law that radically changed the employment relations conditions in the 
public sector and included an article that paves the way for the neutralisation 
of sectoral agreements (Law 4024/2011). The new law introduces several 
fundamental reforms in the system of collective bargaining, and seems to 
address the major points set out by the Troika in its July report
13
. 
Indeed, the government decided to adopt the Troika’s recommendations 
regarding the SOCAs, and eliminated them altogether. Instead of signing a 
‘special’ firm-level agreement, any firm (and not only the ones facing financial 
strains) can now sign a firm-level agreement that, for the duration of the 
Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (i.e. until 2015), may prevail over the sectoral 
agreement even if it contains worse terms and conditions of employment than 
the latter; the firm-level agreement, however, cannot contain provisions 
worse than the ones agreed at the national level. Moreover, the sectoral or 
occupational agreements cannot be extended to all employees of the said 
sector or occupation, contrary to the practice thus far. Therefore, to be 
                                                 
13
 When we were putting the finishing touches on the manuscript, the Papadimos’ 
government re-opened the issue of the renegotiation of the minimum wage between the 
social partners. Although all four social partners were against the elimination of the national 
minimum wage, there is strong belief that a redefinition of the context of wage will take 
place in the next months. As Mr Daskalopoulos – SEV’s president – said: “…SEV will do 
whatever it takes not to hurt the minimum wage. What we are called to do in this dramatic 
economic juncture and in this critical time is to see how the average cost of labour can be 
formed at a different equilibrium point that will help employment and production 
competitiveness” (our translation).  
(http://www.sev.org.gr/online/viewNews.aspx?id=2018&mid=8&lang=gr, accessed on 7 
January 2012). 
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covered by a sectoral agreement, an employer must be represented by (i.e. be 
a member of) the employers’ association that co-signed the agreement. 
These two provisions set the bases for the decentralisation-proper of 
collective bargaining, as they allow companies to sign firm-level agreements 
that are not in any way bounded by the wage levels agreed at the sectoral 
level. To further facilitate this move, the new law extends the right to sign 
collective agreements to companies employing less than fifty employees, or to 
companies with no firm-level trade unions. In this case, a firm-level agreement 
may be signed by an association of employees which represents at least 3/5 of 
the company’s employees, a right that until now was reserved either for the 
firm-level unions, or for the local or national sectoral unions. Through this 
provision, the legislator ensures that the sectoral unions will be absent from 
the process and the employers will be able to negotiate a derogation in the 
terms and conditions of employment from the sectoral agreement in the 
‘protective environment’ of their companies.  
The adoption of these provisions obviously facilitates the signing of collective 
agreements at the firm level without the restriction imposed on the 
employers by the SOCAs. From now on any company (and not only the ones 
that faced financial strains, as was the case under the SOCAs) may sign a firm-
level agreement offering worse terms and conditions of employment than the 
ones agreed at the sectoral level, without facing any interventions either from 
the sectoral unions or from the Labour Inspectorate. The establishment of a 
second negotiating party at the firm level – the association of employees – 
further simplifies the process, for the foundation of this body is easier and 
faster than the formation of a trade union. In cases where a trade union also 
existed in the company, the association of employees may constitute an intra-
firm rival to the existing structure and prove to be a more ‘reliable’ partner for 
the employer. Yet, as with the adoption of all the previous measures, the 
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success of this one is not necessarily guaranteed. The logic of decentralisation 
and of the internal devaluation the Troika promotes, apart from its various 
theoretical and empirical problems (e.g. Ioakeimoglou 2010), may not 
necessarily yield the results expected by the government or the Troika, as 
these are expressed in the latter’s reports and in the preamble preceding each 
law  (i.e. the preservation of jobs through the reduction of labour costs and 
the creation of new placements through the development of investments). To 
see why this is so, it is necessary to examine these changes in the light of 
Greece’s specificities. 
 
3. Institutional Change and Path Dependence 
Having presented the different facets of institutional change, the pertinent 
question becomes: will these changes succeed in yielding the expected 
results? Although we cannot fully answer the question, one has to 
differentiate analytically between institutional changes and outcomes: the 
institutional changes alter the range of options for the actors but this may not 
lead mechanistically to changing practices in the labour market. Even more, 
one could go even further and doubt the capacity of the measures to achieve 
their stated aims, i.e. to reduce labour costs, make the economy more 
competitive, attract investment, and eventually limit unemployment. In a 
nutshell, the former investigation is primarily concerned with the adoption of 
the proposed measures by the firms and their employees, whereas the latter 
contests the logic of the policy measures and the theoretical premises on 
which they are based.  
This section relies on insights from the VoC literature (see, among others, Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Amable 2003; Hancké, Rhodes et al. 2007) to gauge the 
shortcomings and speculate on the possible implications from this institutional 
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change. Our evaluation of the institutional changes in the previous sections 
substantiates the view that the Greek system of industrial relations is speedily 
liberalised and pushed towards convergence to the Liberal market model of 
decentralised bargaining. However, we contend that this direction of change 
will not yield the expected results, because the changes ignore the path-
dependencies and specificities of the Greek model of capitalism. According to 
Hall & Soskice (2001) the two “institutionally coherent” models of capitalism – 
the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and the Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs) – are capable of high economic performance, because their 
institutional arrangements are harmonically characterised by 
‘complementarities’. The concept denotes tightly coupled institutional 
arrangements; the industrial relations system does not operate in a vacuum, 
but is intimately linked to other institutional spheres such as the training 
system, the product markets, corporate governance and the innovation 
system.  
Hence, the move towards liberalisation of industrial relations institutions will 
not necessarily lead to any type of competitive advantage, if the other 
elements of the model that contribute to comparative advantage are missing. 
Greece, just like other Mediterranean model countries (Amable 2003; Almond 
2011: 54) is described as having strong employment protection, especially in 
large firms, and fringes of flexible/informal employment in small firms; bank-
based access to funding; underdeveloped financial markets and a weak 
vocational training system with emphasis on low and general skills. As a 
corollary, it lacks the crucial ‘complementarities’ that contribute to high 
economic performance (Molina and Rhodes 2007).  
One of the main lessons from recent research in varieties of capitalism is that 
institutions are embedded in a wider societal context, and cannot just be 
transplanted from one country to another. But this argument begs the 
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question: what are those specificities in the Greek case that will likely 
influence the implementation of the changes? We argue that there are three 
distinct elements of the Greek model of capitalism that make ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
policies unsuitable for such a context. 
 
3.1. Lack of collective processes experience at the firm level and the 
corporatist character of Greek trade unions 
The new provisions on collective negotiations have created a new 
representation arena which, until today, remained at the periphery of the 
collective bargaining processes. Until recently, the institutional framework of 
Greek industrial relations did not provide the opportunity to employees in 
small and very small companies to form a firm-level union since, according to 
Greek civil law, the formation of a union requires at least twenty signatories. 
Even if a union was formed, however, the previous framework allowed 
collective agreements to be signed only in companies employing more than 
fifty employees. In a country where 98% of its companies employ less than ten 
employees (Giannakopoulos, Laliotis et al. 2011), it is fairly obvious that a vast 
majority of the labour force never had any experience of firm-level collective 
processes. The industrial relations actors, therefore, face an important 
institutional change that creates new structural conditions in the industrial 
relations system that may prove quite difficult to manage: workplaces with no 
prior experience in collective processes – be it union organising or collective 
bargaining – are suddenly faced with the possibility of engaging in social 
dialogue. 
Labour cost reduction according to the decentralisation model purported by 
the Troika and the government requires the existence of collective institutions 
at the firm level. An important question, therefore, concerns the possibility of 
the emergence of such structures in establishments with no prior experience 
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of collective processes. Under the current conditions in the labour market and 
the industrial relations system, such a prospect is rather bleak; within a 
context of legitimate informality in the handling of industrial relations issues – 
as is the one currently in existence – it will be very difficult for firm-level 
collective institutions to emerge. If such a prospect is to materialize, it will 
require the assistance of the already existing structures – i.e. of the sectoral or 
occupational trade unions.  
Yet, at the current juncture, these bodies seem unable or unwilling to organise 
the workforce at the firm level. Trade union density stands at around 28% 
(18% in the private sector)
14
, with unions having a strong presence in the civil 
service and the public sector enterprises, and in ‘traditional’ manufacturing or 
services industries (such as electricity, banking, telecommunications, railways, 
etc.). However, in sectors characterised by insecurity and precarious 
employment, the unions’ presence is almost non-existent leaving a majority of 
this workforce un-unionised (Kretsos 2011). The inability of the unions to 
address this representation gap is due to their strategic choice to concentrate 
their pressure on the state and to engage in corporatist settlements in the 
political arena, rather than on the workplace. 
 
3.2. The adversarial context of industrial relations  
Another endemic characteristic of the Greek industrial relations system is the 
adversarial context of relationships between firms and employees. Thus, even 
if a collective body emerges in the workplace, it does not necessarily mean 
that a collective agreement will be voluntarily signed, for the employer may 
be unwilling to do so. Although the employers do not have the right to 
unilaterally decline an invitation to collective bargaining, the new institutional 
                                                 
14
 EIROnline: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/greece_3.htm. Accessed on 19 
December 2011. 
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framework allows them a range of other options. In the case the negotiations 
between the employer and the employees fail, both parties can revert to 
mediation where the negotiations may continue until an agreement is reached 
or until the mediator issues a decision. Although, according to the older 
provisions, the employer has an interest in reaching an agreement at this 
stage, the new arbitration context makes it very attractive for the employer to 
act in a non-cooperative way and deny the mediator’s proposal. Employers 
can use the new context to neutralise the firm-level union by appealing to 
arbitration since, at this stage, the arbitrator (i) is obliged to reach a decision 
based on the company’s financial situation, (ii) cannot provide any wage 
increases above the annual level of the European inflation, and (iii) can only 
regulate wages, leaving the rest aspects of the collective agreement (e.g. 
benefits, working time arrangements etc.) unregulated and on the two parties 
to negotiate. Yet, in such a conflictual context, to reach a common agreement 
on the aforementioned issues after the arbitration stage seems highly 
unlikely. In this case, if a new collective agreement is not signed within six 
months from the expiration of the old one, the employer can implement 
either the provisions of a less favourable collective agreement or to revert to 
the unilateral management of the employment relationship through the 
implementation of individualised employment contracts.  
The individualisation of the employment relationship seems to be the most 
probable result of the new measures, as the employers, from their part, will 
make slight efforts (if at all) in encouraging collective processes in their 
enterprises. There are three important reasons for this: first, Greek employers 
seem reluctant to share power with their employees, and the establishment 
of a collective representation implies exactly this, as through the negotiation 
process the employers share information with their staff and provide them 
with voice in certain aspects of their employment contract. Second, firm level 
bargaining creates a costly and inflexible situation, for a collective agreement 
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establishes common rules for the whole workforce, and the employer cannot 
easily deviate from its rulings, thus creating an inflexible situation. Third, data 
thus far reveal that the employers utilise the provisions of Laws 3846/2010 
and 3863/2010, especially regarding the implementation of flexible forms of 
employment (SEPE 2010).
15
 This behaviour implies that employers are very 
prone in adopting measures to reduce their labour costs without much 
consideration to the effects their actions may have on their employees’ 
efficiency and productivity. One may suppose, therefore, that if the employers 
can choose between collective bargaining and individual bargaining, they will 
opt for the latter, which is more flexible and its contents easier to manipulate. 
 
3.3. The informal economy and state incapacity for effective labour inspection 
Finally, employers retain the option to ‘exit’ from the formal economy, despite 
the various institutional changes. The continued state incapacity (or 
indifference) to enforce labour law to free-riding companies may increase the 
number of firms opting for that option. The shadow economy is estimated at 
about 30% of the GDP and, in this sphere, no law applies and undeclared work 
is widespread with students, women, and especially migrants working under 
conditions of unlimited flexibility. In the absence of credible sanctions and 
effective disincentives towards undeclared work, the cost-benefit analysis of 
firms is likely to lead them to the ‘low road’ of informality. Negotiating 
reduced wages ‘under the table’ rather than going through the process of 
negotiating with associations of employees may look more attractive.  
                                                 
15
 According to the 2010 Labour Inspectorate Report (p.56-8), in 2010 part-time or 
subsidised short-time work contracts have increased by 25% and 56% respectively since 
2009, whereas, for the same period, the conversion of full-time contracts to part-time and 
short-time work contracts has experienced an increase of 61% and 56% respectively. 
  26 
In a nutshell, the move towards the more decentralised bargaining structure is 
likely to be mediated by existing specificities and path-dependencies of the 
Greek system of industrial relations. Unlike the ‘controlled decentralisation’ 
that is envisaged by the government and the troika, we will likely observe a 
process of uncontrolled, informal, and individual decentralisation. At this 
juncture, the costs of collective bargaining are too high for firms to bear; 
probably many firms will be less likely to become members of employers 
associations to circumvent the obligation to apply collective bargaining 
minima, and many may choose the road most commonly travelled – i.e. that 
of individual negotiations and individual employment contracts. The Greek 
labour market will experience a steep increase of individual contracts, a 
downgrading of the institution of collective bargaining both at the sectoral 
and at the firm level,  and a rise in flexible and unregulated forms of 
employment, not only in the already precarious workforce but in segments of 
the, until now, ‘protected’ employees. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the global economic crisis has the potential to destabilise 
models of capitalism, and certainly arrangements in the industrial relations 
realm. Yet, there is little consensus on where the countries are heading or 
how to conceptualise the mechanisms of institutional change. The countries 
from the Mediterranean model of capitalism are tragic protagonists in the 
Euro-zone crisis. Greece and Portugal have already been bailed out by the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while Spain and 
Italy are considered as the top candidates for a ‘contagion’ from the sovereign 
debt crisis. Intuitively, this is not totally surprising. Given the ‘incoherence’ in 
the political economy of the Mediterranean model of capitalism, the 
countries’ competitiveness problems become evident and well manifested. 
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Although the current sovereign debt problems cannot be fully explained by 
VoC insights, the VoC framework suggests that the absence of ‘institutional 
complementarities’ will exacerbate the problems of competitiveness in 
Mediterranean capitalist countries. Thus, their vulnerabilities will be exposed 
in the context of a deepening recession, and global markets will doubt their 
ability to repay debt, increasing the ‘spreads’ and further downgrading their 
credit ratings.  
In the industrial relations realm, the current pressures from global financial 
markets will likely intensify the push towards liberalizing the wage bargaining 
institutions within the Mediterranean capitalism countries. The Greek 
industrial relations system is a case in point. The signing of the Memorandum 
radically alters the existing institutions of the labour market, since the 
relaxation of the limits in collective dismissals, the transformation of the 
process and content of mediation and arbitration, and the possibility for 
derogation of sectoral agreements establish the necessary conditions for the 
liberalisation of the employment contract. 
Yet, it was argued that the changes are unlikely to fulfil their stated intentions, 
let alone produce ‘comparative advantages’ and increase the competitiveness 
of the Greek economy, as they disregard the specificities and path-
dependencies of the Greek model. More specifically, the changes ignore that 
Greece entails a protected segment in the labour market along a sizeable 
informal sector, and lacks effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms 
that contribute to the prevalence of informality. The institutional pre-
conditions for striking a successful comparative advantage are missing and, 
therefore, the liberalization of industrial relations will probably lead to the 
‘worse of both worlds’: low economic performance and low social cohesion. 
Greek firms are more likely to respond in a path-dependent manner by 
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individualising the employment contract or by circumventing the institutional 
framework using informal or illegal practices. 
Admittedly, our paper focused on narrowly examining the direction of 
institutional changes and ignored the underlying interactions between 
involved actors. In the past, institutional change in models of capitalism was 
perceived as an incremental and path dependent process, with the pressures 
of global markets from intensification of competition mounting slowly over 
time. The reforms and institutional changes were a result of the interactions 
between domestic actors (business, labour, and the state), who carved out 
their strategies and forged coalitions which drove the changes in the 
institutions.  
Instead, we now observe that changes are swift and abrupt, and that global 
financial markets are able to put tremendous pressures on nation-states. 
Institutional change in the bailed-out EU countries is not anymore the 
outcome of interactions between domestic actors, and national governments 
seem to be limited to a second-mover role and are forced to pursue reforms 
and changes that were not necessarily part of their agenda. The involvement 
of international actors in domestic institutional change highlights the 
necessity for a renewed research agenda that entails studying the strategies 
and interactions between both domestic and international actors with regard 
to institutional change. 
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